A Tale of 2 Stans

I've written here before that amateurs study tactics while professionals study logistics, in Afghanistan this may just be true.  Consider the events of the past 10 days or so.  First, Russia seemingly pressured Kyrgystan to close Manas Airbase, a major airbase, and then a major bridge through the Kyber pass in Pakistan was blown up.   Nearly 80% of the supplies for Coalition Forces are trucked in through Pakistan, of the remaining 20%, the majority is flown in, often via Manas Airbase. 

 As Tom Ricks said on one of the Sunday shows this week, it tough to win the war in Afghanistan when the enemy fights it in Pakistan.  So, we are now struggling to find new ways to flow equipment and troops into Afghanistan while at the same time increasing troop levels by as many as 30,000 Soldiers.  No matter the road we choose its going to be expensive.  

Other Afghanistan Notes and Tidbits

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) consists of the troops from all of the other countries other than the U.S.  As always American Soldiers have co-opted the acronym and made it their own, here are some of their ideas.

"I Suck At Fighting"

"Internationals Sit, Anglos Fight"

"I Suntan At FOBs"

"I Steal Americans' Food"

"I Sit At FOB"

"I Saw Americans Fight"

"I Stay Away from Fighting"

Finally, I've been reading alot of Tom Rick's Blog at Foreign Policy.com.  In case you've not heard of him, he wrote a scathing book on the first years for of the Iraq war titled Fiasco.  His lastest book is The Gamble, and talks about how the Surge came to be.  Anyway, he had a six part series on the Battle of Wanat.

Just before dawn last July 13, Taliban fighters attacked an outpost in eastern Afghanistan being established by U.S. Army soldiers and fought a short, sharp battle that left many American dead -- and many questions. But the U.S. military establishment, I've found after reviewing the Army investigation, dozens of statements given by soldiers to investigators, and interviews with knowledgeable sources, simply has not wanted to confront some bad mistakes on this obscure Afghan battlefield -- especially tragic because, as the interviews make clear, some of the doomed soldiers knew they were headed for potential disaster.

Finally, I have written here about LTC John Nagl, since retired.  He has joined a think tank called "The Center for a New American Security" which seems to be a center left national security organization.  Anyway, he wrote, again in Foreign Policy  about the challenges facing the United States in Afghanistan.  Nagl was one of the Officers who was charged with writing the FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  Again, a good read if you have a chance.  

Next up, some thoughs on the Levels of Warfare from FM 3-0, and how all wars are political. 

There are three levels of warfare. First is the Strategic. It’s the level at which national goals and policies are set and the whole spectrum of national power is incorporated - military, diplomatic, economic, and industrial. It’s the big of the big picture. Next is the Tactical level. It’s theater specific and zooms things in a notch or two and is aimed at setting conditions for strategic goals to be met within a theater of operations. It focuses on the near and mid-term fights to achieve victory. Last there is the Operational level. It’s the Soldier and groups of Soldiers. It’s man against his adversary. It’s small units fighting other small units.

I have some thoughts on where the breakdown is occuring, and how you can be successful at two of these levels yet fail in attaining your political objectives.