NY Times on the Drone War in Pakistan

The Downside of Letting Robots Do the Bombing
By MARK MAZZETTI
Published: March 22, 2009
As drone strikes kill off Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, Washington struggles to understand the long-term implications of a push-button conflict.



Pretty good article in this weeks NY Times talking about the danger of relying on Drones to do our dirty work in Pakistan.  We really do need the support of the Pakistani people to be successful in Afghanistan, I don't think this is the way to go about it.

Tales From Torture’s Dark World

Tales From Torture’s Dark World

By Mark Danner
NY Times 14 March 2009

After former President Bush revealed that we had been holding suspected terrorists in so called CIA "Black Sites", the International Red Cross interviewed 14 of these prisoners. This article outlines some of the treatment we subjected them to. It really is a shame that as Americans our government acted in this way on our behalf and that high level officials allowed it to happen, somehow believing it ultimately made us safer.  Its hard to feel sorry for these prisoners, considering what they are supected of doing, what I feel is ashamed that officials representing what our my supposed values justify this behavior as being for my safety.  If anything the fact that these men were tortured will only fuel the hatred that certain groups of people feel for us.  It seems we could have accomplished so much more by demanding the moral high road, the treatment we afforded these prisoners is exactly what these groups would do to an American if they got a hold of them, this doesn't make in right, in fact it makes it all the more wrong.

“They placed a cloth or cover over the box to cut out all light and restrict my air supply. As it was not high enough even to sit upright, I had to crouch down. It was very difficult because of my wounds. The stress on my legs held in this position meant my wounds both in the leg and stomach became very painful. I think this occurred about three months after my last operation. It was always cold in the room, but when the cover was placed over the box it made it hot and sweaty inside. The wound on my leg began to open and started to bleed. I don’t know how long I remained in the small box; I think I may have slept or maybe fainted.

“I was then dragged from the small box, unable to walk properly, and put on what looked like a hospital bed, and strapped down very tightly with belts. A black cloth was then placed over my face and the interrogators used a mineral water bottle to pour water on the cloth so that I could not breathe. After a few minutes the cloth was removed and the bed was rotated into an upright position. The pressure of the straps on my wounds was very painful. I vomited.

“The bed was then again lowered to horizontal position and the same torture carried out again with the black cloth over my face and water poured on from a bottle. On this occasion my head was in a more backward, downwards position and the water was poured on for a longer time. I struggled against the straps, trying to breathe, but it was hopeless.”

After being placed again in the tall box, Abu Zubaydah “was then taken out and again a towel was wrapped around my neck and I was smashed into the wall with the plywood covering and repeatedly slapped in the face by the same two interrogators as before.

“I was then made to sit on the floor with a black hood over my head until the next session of torture began. The room was always kept very cold.

This went on for approximately one week.”

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What's Next in Afghanistan

Today, the Pentagon announced it was sending approximately 12,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, approximately 8,000  Marines and one Army Stryker Brigade with about 4,000 Soldiers.  This will be the first time a Stryker Brigade has been deployed and these will be the first truly Armored Combat Vehicles to be deployed to Afghanistan to date.  Time will tell how it fares on the narrow, unimproved roads that are characteristic of the country. 

Defense Secretary Gates and President Obama have hinted that they will soon unveil a new way forward in Afghanistan.  General Petraeus has H.R. McMaster and a team of Officers conducting a review of the options there.  Numerous advisors who I greatly respect have weighed in on this issue, their names will be familiar to those of you who read regularly. 

• John Nagl, former Army Officer, current president of CNAS, and widely regarded as a counterinsurgency expert was recently a member of a panel talking about Afghanistan on NPR's Diane Rehm Show, you can listen to the segment here.
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• David Kilcullen, former advisor to General Petraeus and Condoleeza Rice, who writes for Small Wars Journal testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, an edited version of his statement can be found here.
  

Obviously a new top down strategy is what is needed here.  Here are some of my thoughts.

• Figure out what we want Afghanistan to look like. What are our strategic goals for Afghanistan and the region?  These need to be modest.  Afghanistan is in many ways stuck in the far past.  They simply do not have modern infrastructure outside of the major cities.  There is no road network, communication network etc.  People go there entire lives never knowing what exists outside of their valley.  The United States cannot afford to bring Afghanistan into the modern world, at least not in the near term, and certainly not with military forces.  Many other Government organizations will need to be involved, including the State Department, Agriculture, etc.  

• Stop the Drone War.  The fact that we have the capability to drop precision munitions and fire hellfire missiles with impunity from un-manned drones piloted by Airmen sitting in trailers in the Arizona Desert is a testament to the unmatched reach of our Armed Forces.  But in this conflict, the technology is doing more harm than good.  Kilcullen writes:  "If we want to strengthen our friends and weaken our enemies in Pakistan, bombing Pakistani villages with unmanned drones is totally counterproductive,"   Every civilian death, intentional or not, has drastic consequences on our ability to influence the populations of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  I believe we have become too dependant on Air Strikes, which inevitably kill or maim innocent civilians.  David Kilcullen set forth the following rules to determine whether to carry out an attack on Pakistani soil.  

1) The target in question poses a threat to the international community (not solely to U.S.forces or interests in Afghanistan);
2) It is located in an area outside of effective Pakistani or Afghan sovereignty (e.g. in a non-controlled area of FATAor in a micro-haven elsewhere)
3) Pakistan has tried but failed to extend its sovereignty into the area, or to deal effectively with the target on its own
4) The target is positively identified and clearly distinguishable from surrounding populations, reducing the risk of collateral damage to a level acceptable to elected political leaders.

Enough for now, obviously there will be more news in the days ahead.

A Tale of 2 Stans

I've written here before that amateurs study tactics while professionals study logistics, in Afghanistan this may just be true.  Consider the events of the past 10 days or so.  First, Russia seemingly pressured Kyrgystan to close Manas Airbase, a major airbase, and then a major bridge through the Kyber pass in Pakistan was blown up.   Nearly 80% of the supplies for Coalition Forces are trucked in through Pakistan, of the remaining 20%, the majority is flown in, often via Manas Airbase. 

 As Tom Ricks said on one of the Sunday shows this week, it tough to win the war in Afghanistan when the enemy fights it in Pakistan.  So, we are now struggling to find new ways to flow equipment and troops into Afghanistan while at the same time increasing troop levels by as many as 30,000 Soldiers.  No matter the road we choose its going to be expensive.  

Other Afghanistan Notes and Tidbits

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) consists of the troops from all of the other countries other than the U.S.  As always American Soldiers have co-opted the acronym and made it their own, here are some of their ideas.

"I Suck At Fighting"

"Internationals Sit, Anglos Fight"

"I Suntan At FOBs"

"I Steal Americans' Food"

"I Sit At FOB"

"I Saw Americans Fight"

"I Stay Away from Fighting"

Finally, I've been reading alot of Tom Rick's Blog at Foreign Policy.com.  In case you've not heard of him, he wrote a scathing book on the first years for of the Iraq war titled Fiasco.  His lastest book is The Gamble, and talks about how the Surge came to be.  Anyway, he had a six part series on the Battle of Wanat.

Just before dawn last July 13, Taliban fighters attacked an outpost in eastern Afghanistan being established by U.S. Army soldiers and fought a short, sharp battle that left many American dead -- and many questions. But the U.S. military establishment, I've found after reviewing the Army investigation, dozens of statements given by soldiers to investigators, and interviews with knowledgeable sources, simply has not wanted to confront some bad mistakes on this obscure Afghan battlefield -- especially tragic because, as the interviews make clear, some of the doomed soldiers knew they were headed for potential disaster.

Finally, I have written here about LTC John Nagl, since retired.  He has joined a think tank called "The Center for a New American Security" which seems to be a center left national security organization.  Anyway, he wrote, again in Foreign Policy  about the challenges facing the United States in Afghanistan.  Nagl was one of the Officers who was charged with writing the FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  Again, a good read if you have a chance.  

Next up, some thoughs on the Levels of Warfare from FM 3-0, and how all wars are political. 

There are three levels of warfare. First is the Strategic. It’s the level at which national goals and policies are set and the whole spectrum of national power is incorporated - military, diplomatic, economic, and industrial. It’s the big of the big picture. Next is the Tactical level. It’s theater specific and zooms things in a notch or two and is aimed at setting conditions for strategic goals to be met within a theater of operations. It focuses on the near and mid-term fights to achieve victory. Last there is the Operational level. It’s the Soldier and groups of Soldiers. It’s man against his adversary. It’s small units fighting other small units.

I have some thoughts on where the breakdown is occuring, and how you can be successful at two of these levels yet fail in attaining your political objectives. 

Yes We Did!

I don't want to wade to deeply into political waters, but I think I at least owe a post or two to our new President.  Mary and I have both followed Obama for a little while, I read both of his books in the summer of 2006, and tracked him pretty closely ever since.  I predicted his victory more than two years before it happened, though not publicly, so where's the proof right?  Anyway, I was extremely gratified to see him win on election night.  I was so hopeful that as a country we could show the world that we are better than the last eight years have shown, and we did.  After Obama gave his speech that night, my comment was "Way to go America, way to get your head out of your collective ass"  Which spawned this logo:

Anyway, I won't write more, I'll include specifics in future posts.  Thanks for reading...if anyone did!

Army Suicide Rates Reach Highest Levels in Thirty Years

Army Data Show Rise in Number of Suicides

In 2008 the Army set yet another record for the number of Soldiers committing suicide, the first month of 2009 looks to continue that trend.  January has seen 7 confirmed suicides with another 17 still under investigation, but most likely suicides as well.  Obviously this has serious repercussions all the way up the Army chain of command.  Suicide prevention has always been a

 yearly training requirement for every Soldier.  Recently the Army has began a new "campaign" designed to encourage every Soldier to look out for his buddy.  During our recent training, the Chaplain remarked that you can't measure the success of a suicide prevention program by the number of "successful" suicides, you can only measure it by the number of suicides prevented.  I guess there is some truth to that, but the numbers are really alarming.  I think you can point to several keys for why the Army in particular is experiencing these unprecedented suicide rates

1. Demographics.  Young white males are the segment of the general population most likely to commit suicide.  Obviously there are hundred's of thousands of young white males serving in the Armed Forces
   
2. Availible Means.  Simply put, every Soldier knows how to use a gun.  Every Soldier serving in a combat zone carries one with him every where they go.  With the means to commit suicide so readily available, there is no buffer, or cooling off period.
3. Lengthy Deployments.  The Thanksgiving I spent in Iraq, '07, a unit had just arrived in country for a 15 month tour.  They were just flowing in at Thanksgiving, they would spend that Thanksgiving away from their loved ones.  Christmas, The Super Bowl, Valentines Day, at least one birthday, the 4th of July, Baseball season, another Thanksgiving, Another Christmas, Another Superbowl...In fact they are still there, hopefully they can be home for theis Valentine's day.  If you think that this isn't a factor, you're crazy.  Only the Army faces 15 month deployments, if we're lucky we get 12 months home with family before its back for another round.
4. Relationships Dissolving.  See Above...its alot to ask for someone to wait 15 months for a loved one to come home.  The Army seems to reward questionable/ unstable relationships monetarily.  Example:  Married Soldiers recieve a Basic Allowance For Housing (BAH) tax free each month, single Soldiers don't.  That is a strong incentive to get married immediately before a deployment.  Its alot to ask a wife you've known for six months to wait another 15 for you to get home.  A heartbreaking phone call or e-mail, the helplessness that comes with not being able to do anything about it, and you can see where it leads.
5. The toughguy mentality.  Put bluntly, in the Army those that seek treatment for any wound that isn't physical, are seen as weak.  Suck it up.  This is doubly true for a Soldier in a leadership position, instead of being an example of seeking help for a legitimate problem, many in leadership are hesitant to seek help because of the way they feel their subordinates will percieve them.  It takes along time to change the culture of an organization as "macho" as the Army, it may never happen.  Until recently, in order to obtain or extend a security clearance, we had divulge whether or not we'd ever sought treatment from a Mental Health Professional, answer yes, and alot more questions would be asked, and your career could be in jeopardy.  Official guidance has come out that says if you receive counsling for PTSD you are no longer required to check the yes block.  A good idea, but I doubt its enough.

I'm back

Anne's sick today, so I'm home, keeping her rested and fed.  An opportunity to write a bit then.  I haven't had a post on this blog in quite some time, doubtful that anyone will find there way back, but I'll try not to let that slow me down, I have quite a few things on my mind that I think need to come off.  There's no one theme obviously, here's a quick list off the top of my head.

• Obama victory
• Obama Inauguration
• Obama effect on how the world views the U.S.
• Iraq
• Afghanistan
• The Army

I guess that's a good start for now, so lets get going!

Update Coming

I have a lot I want to write about here, when I get a chance...Obama, world affairs, etc., I can't believe I havent' added anything in 10 months!!

Passing the Time

Not That I'm Counting Down!

Its been a while huh? No real reason, other than not feeling like writing, I apologize for those of you who read regularly and are tired of visiting only to see me and Santa Clause, I guess I need one with St. Patrick, or the Easter Bunny. Since I last wrote, so much has happened, but at the same time, nothing has changed. I don't usually write about my personal affairs on this blog, but I will share that on January 23rd Mary and I were blessed with the arrival of our daughter, Anne Elizabeth. Since then everything I am doing over here takes a back seat to simply making it home safe. I understand that's not a great way to spend 90 days of your life, waiting for a date on a wall to arrive, but that's the way it is. Lately we've been preparing to recieve the next team, updating records, accounting for property etc., etc., As a result our advising and training role has taken a back seat, therefore, no fun adventures, just time, ticking by.

When's Dad Coming Home??

Happy Thanksgiving

Well, we just celebrated Thanksgiving here at FOB Sykes, my third Thanksgiving in the Middle East in the last seven years. As always the food was outstanding, but nothing compares to being home and seeing the people you love. I even treated myself to a cinnamon roll for breakfast, but no-one comes close to Mom's cinnamon rolls. Unfortunately, being 8 hours ahead of the United States means that alot of Thanksgiving traditions don't really work, for example...The Macy's day parade started at 4 p.m. here, the first football game came on at 8:30p.m. But the chow hall did a great job in preparing a feast, and doing what they could to make us feel at home.

Interpreter "Gus" picking up some eggs in downtown Tal Afar

IRAQI FOOD SERVICE
I've decided to use the occasion of a big Thanksgiving feast to continue my series of posts about Iraqi Logistics, specifically food.
When talking about Iraqi Army Logistics, or just the Iraqi Army for that matter, its helpful to first try to explain or understand how things are supposed to work, and then step back an look at how things are actually working. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense has published policies and procedures for how nearly everything is supposed to work. In most cases these regulations read remarkable similar to U.S. Doctrine, unfortunately, the Iraqi culture is much different than the U.S. culture. One quick example, in my efforts to get to the bottom of how food service was supposed to work, I needed to have a contract translated from Arabic to English. Working with one of my interpreters, we sat down to start pulling out the pertinent information, repeatedly he translated the requirements of the contractor as "The contractory should to X, Y or Z" I kept'saying, "Harold, I know the contract doesn't say 'should' it says 'must' or 'will' 'right?," No sir, it says "should." And that is the Iraqi way, as they say..."Inshalla."

How it's supposed to work:

The Iraqi Army enters into a Life Support contract with a civilian contractor to provide all food service requirements. The contract calls for 3 prepared meals each day, with suitable variety, freshness and nutritional value. The life support contract also includes provisions for cleaning services, laundry services, and building maintenance, among others. Essentially, the life support contractor is required to provide most quality of life support for the Iraqi Junood (soldiers.) Each month, the Iraqi Army Battalion S-4 (logistician) is required to submit a Life Support Contract Quality Assessment. This assessment rates each contracted commodity area by percentage and is used to compute how much of the contracted dollar amount the contractor is paid. For example, if the contractor only provided lunch and dinner for the unit, he will only be paid 2/3's of the contracted amount for food services.

What really happens:

First of all, you have to understand that the Life Support Contract was written with certain assumptions, the most important being that the Iraqi Army unit being supported was stationed, or operating out of some sort of permanent base, a base with a dining facility, or at least a central location where food could be prepared. Unfortunately, one of the key principles of counterinsurgency is that security forces live among the people they are protecting. For our IA battalion, this means that we have upwards of half a dozen combat outposts where Soldiers are living and operating 24/7. So, obviously a contractor isn't going to establish a dining facility at each of these small bases, nor would it be feasible to prepare the meals at a central location and deliver them to each of these bases. The solution the Iraqis have come up with is that the contractor only delivers uncooked "groceries." The IA convoys to a central location every 3 or 4 days to pick up the food and then Soldiers cook the food for their units. Sounds like a good solution right? It could be, here are some of the problems:

• Site Selection. The centralized location chosen by the IA is a U.S. Fob. Force Protection requirements for U.S. bases are very strict when it comes to dealing with local national vehicles and personnel. The means that every truck is completely unloaded and reloaded before it can enter the base. Not only does this lead to long delays in convoys entering the FOB, it also results is bruised produce, meat being left in 130 degree heat for hours while the truck is unloaded and then reloaded.
• Transportation of Food. The Iraqi Contractor who provides the food owns one refrigerated semi-trailer, it is used for storage on FOB Sykes. His food warehouse is located approximately 2 hours north of Tal Afar in the city of Dohuk. In order to restock on FOB Sykes, he must load food from his refrigerated warehouse in Dohuk onto a non-refrigerated semi trailer, negotiate numerous Iraqi checkpoints on his drive south, any one of which may require him to unload his cargo for inspection, then pass through the gates at FOB Sykes, another cycle of downloading and uploading. All told, the food my be outside of refrigeration for upwards of 8-10 hours. Not a big deal in November, but meat left outside for 8-10 hours over here in July or August would probably be cooked Medium Well by the time it made it back into refrigeration.
• Food Storage. Most of the combat outposts are not equipped to store large quanitites of food. Rations are stored on the floor, or in soldiers quarters, or next to the latrine. Refrigeration is also limited at these locations. Most of the COPs have freezers, however when the city power is only on for 8-10 hours per day, cold storage becomes a challenge.
• Cooking Fuel. The life support contract provides barely enough fuel to adequately prepare the food. Some weeks the IA is forced to purchase cooking fuel on the economy in order to prepare their food.
• Portability. While often lamented by American Soldiers, the meal ready to eat, or MRE allows the military to conduct days or weeks of operations without worrying about food. One MRE provides more than enough calories to sustain a soldier for 24 hours. The Iraqi Army has no such equivalent. In order to perform "out of sector" missions, they must pack enough groceries, fuel, pots pans, stoves etc, etc, in order to sustain themselves.
  
  
  

  

  
  
  

These are just a few of the challenges which are confronted every day just so the Soldiers can have enough to eat. But, perhaps the biggest one is corruption and bribery.

I'm really not sure how to introduce the story, I'm not sure how prevalent things like this are throughout Iraq, I only know what happened in our case. Due to the deployment of the IA throughout the city, our battalion was consistently rating the contractor as only fulfiling approximately 20% of his contract. However, each month he was getting paid as if he were fulfiling 100% of his contract. When coalition forces along with the IA looked into it further it was discovered that although the customer units, i.e. the battalions, were consistently reporting that the contractor was not fulfiling nearly 80% of his contracted resposibilities, by the time the reports were recieved at the MOD in Baghdad, it appeared that he was being rated 100%. Obviously someone was doctoring the assessments, ensuring the contractor was getting paid much more than he should have. In other words, some Iraqi official was being paid off to doctor official reports. Another interesting story regarding the contractor, after this bit of corruption was revealed, a new contract was put out for bid, the old contractor did not renew his bid, or so it seemed, when the winning bidder was revealed it turned out to be the same contractor, he simply changed his company's name.

The "Other Iraq"

We recently took a trip to a city in Northern Iraq called Dohuk. A city of approximately half a million people, it is set in a valley surrounded on three sides by mountains. As one of the largest cities in the autonomous region of Kurdistan its citizens have enjoyed unbelievable prosperity since the fall of Sadaam. We went to Dohuk to do some shopping for our IA counterparts, there are some things that are hard to find in Tal Afar. After about a two hour drive North, past the precarious Mosul Dam,

we passed a Peshmerga checkpoint, signalling the fact that we were now in Kurdistan.

Once into the city of Dohuk, we left our HMMWV's, Body Armor and Machine Guns at a Peshmerga Military Base and our hired drivers drove us in Land Rovers and new Toyota SUV's to our Hotel.

As we pulled up in front of our Hotel, the first car we saw was a Hummer H2, the first luxury SUV I had seen in over six months, it soon became clear that it wasn't an anomoly however as Infinities, Porches, and numerous BMWs cruised by the hotel within the first 10 minutes of being there. Obviously this was a little different than we were used too.
We spent three two nights in the city, and were treated like celebrities the entire time. I've never had my picture taken so much. A quick taxi ride or a short walk could get you werever you needed to go. I guess I'll just share some pictures now.

My Commute

Here's a video from a trip out to COP Destroyer, it shows what I see from my HMMWV Turret, I'm usually the rear truck gunner responsible for rear security, so I always see everything go by. I put some music over the usual sound because listening to a HMMWV engine for 10 minutes isn't that exciting. A couple things you can see: A Holstein cow in the back of a pick up truck. A herd of sheep walking down a busy street. Tractors, Donkey carts and cars. Have a look.

A Few Thoughts on "Phony Soldiers" and Blackwater

I know my next post is supposed to cover more IA Logistics, specifically how food water and ice is handled, but I wanted to write a bit about a couple of issues that have been in the news lately; Rush Limbaugh's comments about phony soldiers and the recent Blackwater incident in Baghdad.

I haven't seen or heard Rush Limbaugh's comments in full, only what has been either lambasted by democrats or defended by Fox News Pundits. I can only say that to call someone who opposes this war while fighting it phony is a dangerous premise. I'm sure that those of you who read this blog regularly can figure out that I am opposed to this war. I feel that it was wrong of us to invade Iraq. I am tired of the ever evolving change in reasons to continue this war.

• 9/11,
• WMD,
• Civil War,
• Promote Democracy
• Give Petreaus a Chance
• The Surge is Working
• I'll be Out of Office in a Year or So, Let Somebody Else Deal With It
• Don't let Iraq Become a Haven For Terrorists

I am ashamed of the way it has made our country look in the eyes of much of the world. I am disheartened by our continuous lack of social and cultural "grace" when it comes to understanding other areas of the world. I am frustrated by an unwillingness of an organization to realize that the cold war is over and no enemy will again stand toe to toe to the United States. I am saddened by the loss of too many fathers, sons, brothers, mothers, daughters and sisters.

So, does this mean I am a "phony Soldier" I'm sure by some standards it does. It is impossible to judge what happens over here from the comfortable studios of the EIB network. It is impossible to come over here and see the destruction and suffering and not have my eyes opened. Every day, I am forced to look at all the remnants of war which remain in the city. The barriers, wire, checkpoints, abandoned buildings, bullet holes in buildings, crumbled homes, all a result directly or indirectly of our invasion. In my current role, I can feel some sense that what I am doing is critical to ending this war. Soldiers do not make policy, Soldiers do not make war, a Soldier's role in war is to advise the civilian leadership of this country and to execute the decisions made by that civilian leadership. I feel that if a few more "phony Soldiers" had stood up to Cheney and Bush and Rumsfeld, this situation could have been avoided. The president has continued to surround himself with "yes" men. If your closest advisers are "yes" men, it goes without saying that they are redundant and irrelevant. I like to hear people tell me I'm right as much as the next guy, but people in leadership should be more concerned with making sound decisions than to prove that they are the "decider."

A Phony Soldier?

I just wanted to touch on the Blackwater controversy quickly to clear up what I see as misconceptions and to add my two cents. If you follow this story you will hear alot of numbers thrown around concerning contractors and their level of participation in this war. Private security companies do provide armed security on numerous operations. FOB Sykes is guarded by a Turkish security company. Don't think though that contracted security forces outnumber or even approach the numbers of Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen in country. The numbers thrown about on talk shows and other media reports include cooks, bus drivers, crane operators, etc., many of whom are from countries other than the United States. I would estimate that 80% of the contractors on FOB Sykes are from India or Pakistan. They do everything from cleaning bathrooms, hauling garbage, and driving buses, to cooking food, and maintaining HVAC equipment. A private security contractor is very well paid, earning as much around $12,000 a month. The majority of the TCNs (Third Country Nationals) earn less than $1,000 a month. Considerably less than what it would take to pay and equip a soldier to do the same work, but well above the average monthly wage of Pakistan or similar countries. To say that we are privatizing the war is simply, from my point of view, false. The majority of contractors are poorly paid (by U.S. Standards) and provide services which would seem ridiculous to have soldiers perform.

However, I feel that firms such as Blackwater, Aegis and others, are detrimental to what we are trying to accomplish over here. To allow them to continue to operate outside the law is an unfathomably bad idea. Iraqi civilians don't discriminate between contracted security officers and the Military. A violent act commited by Blackwater no doubt leads to hostile actions and feelings against the military. It is time that the State Department of the U.S. Congress takes action to change their lawless behavior.

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The Challenge: Logistics

CPT Doll in a Russian Kroz

"An Army marches on its Stomach" This famous quote is attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, the famous Frenchman who recognized that logistics is often more important than tactics in winning a war. Perhaps the single greatest factor in the world-wide dominance of the United States Armed Forces is our ability to project our power across the globe. This would not be possible without our mature, robust and unprecedented logistics system. As a transportation officer, I have the ability to track a part from its production in a factory until it is delivered to the user on the battlefield, utilizing numerous computer systems and the world wide web. I have the ability to communicate directly with the operator of the vehicle which is carrying the part in case it needs to be diverted or is no longer needed. As a country, we have spent billions of dollars on technology and systems which enable us to get the right part to the right place at the right time. Some claim that "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics." So, it is with great frustration and often disbelief that I have been exposed to "The Iraqi Logistics System." The motto of the Transportation Corps, corny as it may be is "Nothing happens until something moves" The motto of the Iraqi Logistics system could be "Nothing happens until some general in Baghdad says its o.k., but he's probably on leave, so you need to wait a week." I figure the most logical way to explain what we are dealing with is to cover the overarching problems which factor in to all logistical operations, then, in another post, I'll cover the "eaches" by going through each class of supply and explain our challenges. As the logistics adviser, I am directly responsible for developing and improving the logistics leaders in our IA Battalion. Thus far, it has taken me almost 4 months of being on the ground just to wrap my head around how things are supposed to work and how they are in fact working.

Maintenance Training at Cop Destroyer

• An Immature System: When we dismantled the Iraqi Army after the invasion, (against Bush's Orders...he thinks, its hard to remember) the entire Army was summarily dismissed. As we realized that we were facing an insurgency, and the Army would need to be rebuilt, we began by building from the smallest level. First squads, then platoons, then companies, battalions brigades and so on. The Ministry of Defense wasn't even an Idea. I have a colleague here who was a Tank Platoon Leader in OIF II, (we're now in OIF VI) who remembers as the ICDC (Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, a precursor to what is now the Iraqi Army) was being formed, he would be tasked to take Iraqi Security Forces on patrol with him, he would stop by their compound in his tank and pick up three or four, and they would ride out into the city with him on patrols. I tell this story to tell you this, for the first 3 years of Iraqi Security Forces, coalition units provided them with all of their logistics support. We bought their AK-47's, Pistols, and Ammo. We provided them with fuel, barriers, uniforms, everything. While this was effective in establishing them as a fighting force, it only contributed to their logistical dependence on Coalition Forces. Since then, its been an constant uphill battle. In each division there is a logistics company called the Motor Transport Regiment or MTR.

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Destroyed Russian UAZ vehicles sit at Al Kisik

By design they are supposed to provide maintenance and transportation support to the three Brigades in the division. This unit has received its vehicles and theoretically should be capable of executing its mission. However, they have yet to complete a convoy to the National Depot in Taji, and are barely capable of getting even one truck to leave their post and deliver anything. Their maintenance company only last month submitted the list of parts that they need to stock, and they have yet to fix a single truck.

Russian Kroz Trucks at Al Kisik

• Centralized Control: In order for anything to get accomplished in the Iraqi Army, be it tactical operations, promotions, and is seems especially logistics, an Iraqi Officer must be ordered from higher. Initiative and innovation are not rewarded as they are in many cultures. This leads to huge headaches when trying to get supplies such as ammunition etc. Just a quick example which I'll probably reiterate when I discuss Class V: Here's the flow just to receive ammunition, keep in mind that there are millions of rounds in a warehouse not 30 minutes drive outside of Tal Afar where our Battalion operates. Also, IGFC (Iraqi Ground Forces Command) and MOD (Ministry of Defense), are located in Baghdad. A parallel system in the U.S. Army would involve a request for ammunition being approved by two bureaucracies within the Pentagon. Absolutely ridiculous, and the most frustrating part is that it is this way with nearly all supplies. I've attached a power point slide I created to brief my MiTT Team Chief on why our Battlion was struggling so much logistically.

Iraqi Ammunition Resupply Process

Next Time: Class I; Food Water and Ice

The Challenge: Fear of Infiltration

I suppose I’ve expressed enough of my political views in the last month to last a while, I think the situation over here is amazingly complex and history may or may not reveal the truth. But, I suppose it doesn’t matter, whether this war was conceived on deceit, or a genuine belief that things would turn out differently (even if plans weren’t made to ensure anything.) I am here, will be here for at least the next seven months, and regardless of how quickly the democrats promise to bring home the troops if elected, American Soldiers will be advising and developing the Iraqi Army for the foreseeable future. Over the next couple of weeks or so, I plan to write a series of posts covering the challenges that face us as we assess, advise and assist our Iraqi Partners.



Overall, our Iraqi Battalion is quite capable of day to day operations. They man their checkpoints professionally, the leadership is comprised of mostly former members of the Army under Sadaam Hussein. The sectarian divide that gets so much publicity doesn’t seem to exist for us, we have a very good mix of religions, Sunni, Shiite and Yezidi, and a good mix of Arabs and Kurds as well. I’ve never witnessed nor heard of a disagreement which stemmed from sectarian differences. Many Battalions are reported to be infiltrated with insurgents, and that may well be the case with ours. We are careful to never let our guard down when we are with the IA, we never leave our house without a loaded 9mm piston on our hip, though I’ve never felt threatened.



Because of this possible insurgent infiltration, mission planning is very compartmentalized at the higher levels of the Battalion. In the U.S. Army, mission planning is done both from the top down and the bottom up, the Iraqi model is different. The BN Commander may call his company commander on the cell phone and tell him to report to HQ, he will then tell him to have 4 HMMWV’s ready to go in ½ an hour. This is all the info the Company Commander will get out of fear that the target of the raid may be his brother, uncle, cousing, tribesman or someone he knows and he will tip them off. This compartmentalization results in little development of Junior Leaders, they are simply told what to do. Also, the lack of prior knowledge of a mission precludes the Company Commander, who is leading the mission, from doing any type of reconnaissance or detailed planning; only very generic basic rehearsals can be conducted. For example, if you know exactly what house you are targeting, you can plan your ingress and egress routes, determine where to best position your cordon, and identify most likely enemy avenues of approach and escape. All of these are key things to be familiar with before a mission begins and our Iraqi Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders and NCOs are force to operate without them. This leads to numerous raids resulting in what are referred to as “dry holes.” Because escape routes aren’t sealed off before the cordon is set, the targeted individual is able to sneak out of the area.


Next time I’ll write about the logistical problems our BN deals with on a daily basis.

A Multiple Choice Exam

These four scenarios are equally unbelievable and ridiculous, one of them just happens to be true. Just to help you, i've italicized the right answer.

The Federal Government has implemented one of the following plans in order to create positive spin for a failing policy. Pick One.

• The Dept. of Energy has plans to raise the price of gasoline to $4.00 per gallon for six months, then the price will be dropped to May '07 levels, they will then take credit for lowering the price of gas.
• The Border Patrol will allow the next 50,000 illegal immigrants to walk across the border unchallenged, in six months they will round up 50,000 illegal immigrants and deport them, claiming progress in securing our borders.
• The EPA is going to permit clear cutting 10,000 acres of virgin old growth forest in Yellowstone National Park, they will then replant the acreage, an environmental success story we can all appreciate.
• Finally, we will increase troop levels in Iraq from a sustainable 130,000 to 165,000, then when troops are slated to go home, and there are no available forces to replace them, we will claim that due to an improved security situation, we are now able to begin a withdrawal of 35,000 soldiers over the next 4 months. Hey Hey, we're winning the war.

The Petraeus, Crocker hearings made for great entertainment, but I don't think they should be taken for more than that. The "decisions" that came about as their result were already made when the surge was first proposed. We couldn't maintain current troop levels here without doing something drastic. Like pulling even more troops out of Afghanistan, or extending tour lenghts to 18 months. The security situation in this country may be better than it was 4 months ago, but it is still much more dangerous for U.S Forces and the Iraqi people than it was a year ago.

Finally, here's a short clip of Juan Cole discussing what is happening in Al-Anbar. If you don't know by now, I think this guy really has his finger on the pulse of what is happening in Iraq. His latest headlines are always on the right side of this page. I try to read his blog every day. have a look.

Three Years

Three years ago, my father died. Just to type these words is difficult, I think all who loved him are still struggling with the loss. How have three years passed? If you knew Thomas Doll, then you can appreciate the loss we all suffered three years ago. If you never met the man, then no blog post, no matter how well written could possibly explain what he meant to us.

Being in Iraq, away from loved ones, the comforts of home, security, predictability, I find myself constantly wondering what Dad would have thought about the situation here. I would give anything to sit and talk to him about all that I have experienced here in the 17 total months that I have spent in this country. What would he have thought of my role in the first elections in Iraq in January of 2005. What would his reaction be to hearing that the Dining Facility where I ate every day was attacked by a suicide bomber on December 21, 2004? What of the Turkish truck driver who lay bleeding on an Iraqi road while I tried to call for a medevac helicopter to come and pick him up. I wish I could have told him how I spent what would have been his 52^nd birthday at the Combat Support Hospital in Mosul, sitting with one of my squad leaders SSG Mejia who earlier in the day had been blown up by an IED on a road I now travel 3 times a week, and whose eyebrows were singed off and his leg crushed by the HMMWV which came to rest on top of it.

I wonder what Dad would think of the world I now live in. Of the customs and courtesies that are part of my daily life. Of my stories of the Iraqi Army, of the dilapidated house we live in. He would certainly appreciate the way our house is rigged up to work, building codes and American standards be damned. I know he would like the stories about the farmers here, and the broken John Deere combines that are scattered through the country.

Not a day goes by that something doesn't remind me of Dad. He had a way of looking at this world in a way that few can Every new experience, tragedy success and blessing in my life makes me miss him even more.

A 'Non Western' View of Things

This video presents a lot of numbers, just try to imagine this level of human suffering in the U.S.

A few movies

Here's a few movies for your amusement, let me know what you think.

Human Feces on my Boot



Just Back From a Dusty Mission


Chinook Flight to Mosul


Night Vision on the Roof of COP Destroyer

What If?

Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Gen. David Petraeus are slated to deliver their congressionally mandated progress report in a week, conveniently enough on September 11. I don't think there is really much of a question what the report will contain. By my estimation it will be a validation of the surge, it will champion the idea that violence is down across Iraq. Juan Cole at Informed Comment offers the following analysis:

If you compare each month in 2006 with each month in 2007 with regard to US military deaths, the 2007 picture is dreadful.

8-2007 77 8-2006 65
7-2007 79 7-2006 43
6-2007 101 6-2006 61
5-2007 126 5-2006 69
4-2007 104 4-2006 76
3-2007 81 3-2006 31
2-2007 81 2-2006 55
1-2007 83 1-2006 62

I mean, how brain dead do the Bushies think we are, peddling this horse manure that US troop deaths have fallen? (There are always seasonal variations because in the summer it is 120 F. in the shade and guerrillas are too heat-exhausted to fight; but the summer 2007 numbers are much greater than those for summer 2006; that isn't progress.) And why does our corporate media keep repeating this Goebbels-like propaganda? Do we really live in an Orwellian state?

The report will likely make the claim that political progress is slow but moving forward (the Iraqi parliament only recently returned from their summer vacation, apparently its hot in Baghdad in the summer.)

Crocker will brief that reconstruction efforts are taking hold, again a dubious claim at best, Baghdad has considerable less electricity than prewar levels, the city where I work, Tal Afar i only receives about 1/3 the electricity to power the entire city, so 2/3d's of the day the power is out.
Insurgents and militia's control many of the outer province electrical substations and in many cases have taken them "off the grid" thereby depriving Baghdad of power but giving their constituents power virtually all of the time.

One of the largest dams in the North, holding back 8 billion cubic meters of water is "in danger of imminent collapse." If this damn gives way, the city of Mosul and the American FOB Diamondback will be inundated, is there any doubt that recover and disaster relief operations would be a bit slower than those in New Orleans? I wonder what Mike "heckuva job" Brown is up to these days?



What if General Petraeus simply wrote the following:

Mr. President:

The United States Army and Marine Corps achieved their principal mission of overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his government. We did so with dispatch and minimum loss of life. We were then confronted with a massive insurgency which U.S. civilian officials, including yourself, did not anticipate and for which we have not been given adequate personnel and resources. There is little if any prospect of resolving this insurgency anytime in the next decade, if not longer. Further, continued engagement in Iraq's civil war distracts us from our most urgent mission in Afghanistan and erodes our stature in the world. Therefore, it is my recommendation that all U.S. forces be withdrawn from Iraq in an orderly but expeditious manner. In the event that this recommendation is not accepted, I have attached my letter of resignation from the United States Army.

David Petraeus

General, United States Army

Mr. Bush visited Iraq yesterday and stopped in Al Asad, an airbase in the once volatile, always newsworthy al-Anbar province. The al-Anbar has been in the news recently as a success story, local Sunni Tribeman have agreed to stop killing Americans and to focus their violence instead on AlQaeda operatives crossing the Syrian border. But to say that Al Anbar is peaceful and prosperous is simply propaganda. Consider the following:

• Al-Anbar residents killed 20 US troops in July. The total US fatalities in July were 79. Al-Anbar attacks accounted for fully 1/4 of US deaths for the month, while Al-Anbar residents represent only 1/24th of the total Iraqi population.
• In mid-July, There were about 100 violent attacks in a single week in al-Anbar. That's a bright spot. That's progress. Since the year before, there were 400 violent attacks in that same period.
• Since May, if you wanted to get somewhere in Fallujah, you have had to walk. I submit that it is much easier to control a population if you don't allow them to drive. It is certainly easier to prevent the type of huge VBIEDs that have been decimating the yezidi population in the North.
• Economic recovery, humanitarian aid, and simple recover and clean-up are virtually impossible to affect without large vehicles and construction equipment, let alone not even a pick-up truck or the trunk of a car
  

IPS quotes a local Sunni cleric:

' "To say Fallujah is quiet is true, and you can see it in the city streets," said Shiek Salim from the Fallujah Scholars' Council. "The city is practically dead, and the dead are quiet.'

Watch this exchange between CNN's Wolf Blitzer and Republican Rep. Charles Boustany (R-LA)